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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

GREGORY DOUGLAS THOMAS,

:

Case No. 890529-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 or 76-6410 (1978).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989) because the appeal is
from a district court in a criminal case involving a third degree
felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance to defendant.
2.

Whether the jury was erroneously instructed

regarding the value of the items taken.
3.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the

jury's verdict regarding the value of the items taken.
4.

Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct in

statements made in closing argument.

5.

Whether the trial court erred in denying

defendant's motion for new trial.
6.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove

defendant took the items with a purpose to deprive the owner
thereof.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged on March 1, 1989, in the
alternative with theft by deception or theft pursuant to a rental
agreement, either one a third degree felony (Record [hereinafter
R.] at 1-2). The public defenders association entered an
appearance, and preliminary hearing was waived on April 6, 1989
(R. at 8). Thereafter, defendant was represented by Robert L.
Froerer at arraignment, pretrial, and trial (R. at 11, 19, and
21).
Defendant was tried by jury on May 25, 1989, in the
Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, the
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, district judge, presiding (R. at 2123 and Transcript of trial [hereinafter Tr.].

The first page of

the minute entry [R. at 21] lists the date of trial as May 22;
however, the transcript and the subsequent pages of the minute
entry all give May 25 as the trial date).

Defendant was found

guilty as charged (R. at 23 and 27). After a presentence
investigation by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole,
defendant was sentenced on June 19, 1989, to a term in the Utah

State Prison not to exceed five years (R. at 23 and 60). That
sentence was stayed and defendant placed on probation with the
conditions that he serve sixty days in the Weber County Jail with
work release, pay a fine of $240,00 with a surcharge of $60.00,
pay restitution of $320.00 or restore satisfactory pallets, and
submit to mental health evaluation and counseling (R. at 60-61).
On June 26, 1989, defendant's new counsel, David J.
Berceau, filed an application for certificate of probable cause
and a motion for stay of execution of sentence; the court granted
the motion for stay of execution of sentence (R. at 65, 78, 63,
and 79). Defendant also filed a motion for new trial or, in the
alternative, acquittal notwithstanding the verdict (R. at 73-74).
Accompanying the motion for new trial were purported estimates of
the cost of wooden pallets (R. at 70 and unnumbered between 80
and 81). The court conducted a hearing on the motions and, on
August 14, 1989, denied the motion for new trial and granted the
certificate of probable cause (R. at 81-85).

On September 8,

1989, defendant's notice of appeal, dated August 7, 1989, was
filed (R. at 86).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 10, 1989, defendant, a self-proclaimed
dealer in wooden pallets, appeared at Knox McDaniel Company in
Weber County (Tr. at 19 and 56-57).

Knox McDaniel Company

produces animal vitamin and mineral premixes (Tr. at 18). When
Knox McDaniel purchases material, that material is delivered on
wooden pallets and Knox McDaniel is charged $8.00 per pallet (Tr.
at 19 and 34, and trial Exhibit No. 2 which is attached to this

brief as Addendum B).

Knox McDaniel's policy was to then charge

its own customers $8.00 per pallet when the company sent their
product out on the pallets (Tr. at 26-32, 34-35, and trial
Exhibit No. 2, Addendum B).

If the pallets were returned to Knox

McDaniel in good condition, the customer received a credit of
$8.00 (Tr. at 28).
When defendant turned up at Knox McDaniel on January
10th, he spoke with the plant manager, John Erickson (Tr. at 1819).

Defendant asked Mr. Erickson if he could borrow about a

hundred pallets from the company to use in moving rock.
Defendant said that he was short of pallets.

Mr. Erickson

checked the stock of pallets and told defendant he could only
lend him forty pallets.

Defendant did not tell Mr. Erickson that

he worked for a pallet company.

Defendant was very particular

about the kind of pallet he wanted; the company had broken
pallets there, but defendant did not want those (Tr. at 20). Mr.
Erickson helped load the forty pallets on defendant's truck and
told defendant to return them within one week (Tr. at 21).
Defendant and Mr. Erickson agreed that defendant would pay a
$50.00 deposit to ensure the return of the pallets (Tr. at 22).
Mr. Erickson contacted a secretary in the front office,
told her the terms of the agreement for defendant to borrow the
pallets, and asked her to draw up a written agreement for
defendant's signature (Tr. at 21-22).

He also told her to get

defendant's license plate number and his phone number.

Mr.

Erickson also wrote down the license plate number of defendant's
truck (Tr. at 22).

Sheryl K. Cheever was the secretary who took the
information from Mr. Erickson and wrote the agreement which
defendant signed (Tr. at 35-36).

She testified that Mr. Erickson

told her that defendant was borrowing 40 pallets to be returned
within one week and was going to leave a $50.00 deposit.

She was

to get defendant's license plate number and phone number and to
have him sign the paper (Tr. at 36). She wrote out the
agreement, which included the agreed-upon return date, and which
was introduced into evidence as Exhibit No. 1 (Tr. at 37-38, and
attached as Addendum A). When defendant approached Ms. Cheever,
he told her he only had $30.00, and she asked the Knox McDaniel
purchasing agent if that was all right.

When he told her it was,

she wrote $30.00 on the agreement and accepted that amount as a
deposit (Tr. at 37). Ms. Cheever asked for defendant's license
plate and phone numbers and wrote them down as he gave them to
her (Tr. at 37-38).

She handed the document to defendant and

watched him sign it (Tr. at 38).
When defendant had not returned the pallets a month
after he took them, Mr. Erickson began to search for him (Tr. at
24).

He first looked at the agreement which Ms. Cheever had

drawn up and noticed that the deposit amount was less than that
agreed upon and that the license number written on the agreement
was different from the license number which he had written down
(Tr. at 23). Mr. Erickson then called the telephone number
defendant had given Ms. Cheever and found that the number did not
belong to defendant (Tr. at 24). Mr. Erickson then contacted the
police (Tr. at 25).

Detective John Stubbs of the Ogden Police Department
was assigned to the case (Tr. at 40-41).

He investigated the

license plate number written on the agreement and found that it
was a nonexistent registration in Utah.

He next investigated the

license number written down by Mr. Erickson and found that it was
registered to "a Greg Thomas at 1498 South 400 East in Salt Lake
City" (Tr. at 42). A "skip trace" turned up information leading
to a new address for defendant and that defendant worked for the
Rocky Mountain Pallet Company in Salt Lake City.

Investigation

showed that Rocky Mountain Pallet Company no longer existed (Tr.
at 43). Detective Stubbs went to the most current address he had
obtained and spotted defendant's flatbed truck on 45th South in
Salt Lake City (Tr. at 44).
Detective Stubbs stopped the truck and found defendant
was driving it (Tr. at 44). He told defendant why he had stopped
him and gave defendant the Miranda warnings (Tr. at 45).
Detective Stubbs asked defendant about the pallets, and defendant
admitted to having taken them but said he simply had not gotten
around to returning them.

Detective Stubbs asked defendant about

the erroneous license and phone numbers, and defendant answered,
"Well, if you look[,] that isn't my handwriting."

(Tr. at 46).

When the detective told defendant that defendant had provided the
information, defendant "skirted that issue completely and drove
off in a different direction of conversation" (Tr. at 46). By
that, the detective meant that defendant did not answer that
question at all.

Detective Stubbs then placed defendant under

arrest (Tr. at 46).

Detective Stubbs, along with another detective, then
transported defendant to Ogden for booking in the Weber County
Jail (Tr. at 47 and 49). During that drive, defendant steered
the conversation back to the case, asking how he could "make [it]
right, how he could get the charges dropped" (Tr. at 47-48).
Detective Stubbs told defendant that he could not drop the
charges but that telling the truth would impact what eventually
happened in the case (Tr. at 48, 50-51 and 54). Defendant then
said that he would tell what happened (Tr. at 48). Detective
Stubbs testified:
What he [defendant] told me was that he
had already had one deal go sour on him on
the day that he obtained these pallets up
here in Ogden, and he did not want to drive
back to Salt Lake light loaded and with only
$30, and so he had done this deal with Knox
McDaniel. Said that he had never done it
before.
He admitted to giving that information
with respect to the telephone number; he
admitted to giving bad information with
respect to his license number. He said that
he immediately drove the pallets down to Salt
Lake to APCO Pallet Company where he had sold
the pallets for $160.
He said he just did not think that anyone
would make such a big deal out of pallets.
(Tr. at 48).
After the State rested, defendant testified that he was
in the business of buying, repairing and selling pallets and had
been for four years (Tr. at 56). He claimed that he had
purchased 13,000 pallets from the Farmer Jack stores when they
went out of business and still had access to 4000 of those
pallets (Tr. at 58). On cross examination, he testified that he
still had 2000 or 3000 left of those pallets, but then said he

really did not have access to them (Tr. at 78). Then he
testified that he did not have thousands of pallets or he would
not have gone to Knox McDaniel for pallets.

Again, he testified

that he did have access to pallets (Tr. at 80).
On direct, defendant testified that he went to Knox
McDaniel on January 10th looking for broken pallets and that was
what he asked for.

He said that he already had pallets on his

truck and needed forty more (Tr. at 58). He said that Knox
McDaniel only had ten broken ones and Mr. Erickson just told him
to take forty pallets and leave a $50.00 deposit.

Defendant said

that he told Mr. Erickson that he only had $30.00 and Erickson
agreed to that (Tr. at 59). Defendant claimed that he told Ms.
Cheever that his license number was 6436BE and she wrote 6436VE.
He also claimed that he gave her his phone number as 272-3052 and
she wrote 272-3051.

He blamed Ms. Cheever for writing down the

wrong numbers and causing the "whole problem" (Tr.. at 60).
Defendant claimed that he did not know that he was to return the
pallets within one week; he testified that the company was going
to call him when they needed the pallets back or that he had been
told to return them in a couple of weeks (Tr. at 61). He said
the pallets just slipped his mind and he forgot to return them
(Tr. at 62) .
Defendant testified that the pallets he took from Knox
McDaniel were not worth a great deal. At one point he said that
half of the Knox McDaniel pallets were softwood and less valuable
(Tr. at 65). Next he testified that three quarters of the
pallets were softwood (Tr. at 66). He testified that the Knox

McDaniel pallets were only worth $2.50 each because "they were an
average pallet" (Tr. at 66). Defendant explained his statement
to the detectives as merely a ploy to try to get the officers to
tell him what was happening (Tr. at 69). Defendant said that he
told the officers he just forgot about returning the pallets and
that answer "wasn't good enough," so he told the detectives that
he took the pallets to APCO and sold them for $4.00 each (Tr. at
68).

He testified that that statement was not true, that he had

not sold them to APCO, and that APCO would not have paid that
much for the pallets (Tr. at 68-69).
On direct examination, defendant testified that he had
a wife and an eight month old child (Tr. at 68). On cross
examination, he testified that the marriage was common law, but
admitted that, when he was released from the Weber County Jail,
he told the releasing officer that he was single (Tr. at 71-72).
Defendant testified that he had never been to Knox McDaniel
before January 10th, but then, in answer to the next question,
said that he might have been there before (Tr. at 73). On
direct, defendant testified that he had signed the agreement
without looking at it; on cross, he stated that he had glanced at
it (Tr. at 60 and 75).
Finally, defendant called Jamie Puckett, director of
operations for APCO Pallets, as a witness on the value of the
pallets (Tr. at 83-84).

He testified that pallets sold for

"[a]bout $5.50" for number one, hardwood pallets, "[a]bout $4.50"
for rebuilt hardwood, and "about $3.95" for softwood pallets (Tr.
at 85-86).

Then he testified that he bought the different kinds

of pallets for $3.00, $1.50-$2.00, and $1.00 (Tr. at 86).

Mr.

Puckett testified that defendant came to him saying that he was
in "some sort of trouble" and asking for a price quotation for
pallets (Tr. at 87).

Mr. Puckett prepared Exhibit No. 3 in

response to that request (Tr. at 87, and Addendum C ) .
On cross examination, Mr. Puckett testified that he
would not know the value of a pallet set by a wholesaler shipping
on a pallet to a retailer.

He admitted that he did not know the

value a retailer would assess to the pallet when turning around
and sending a product out again on the pallet (Tr. at 89).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that there were numerous errors at
trial which raised the specter of ineffective assistance when
trial counsel did not challenge them.

None of the claims were

error; hence, trial counsel's failure to challenge them was not
ineffective assistance.

Trial counsel's performance was within

the range of professional conduct and did not prejudice
defendant.
The jury instruction given by the court regarding
valuation of the property taken was a correct recitation of the
law.

It was not error for the court to give that instruction.
The jury correctly weighed the conflicting evidence of

value given at trial and correctly determined the value of the
property taken.
The prosecutor's closing argument was a correct comment
on the evidence and did not constitute misconduct.

The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for
new trial.

Most of the issues raised on appeal as the basis for

a new trial were not raised below, and, even if they had been,
would not have justified a new trial.

The one claim preserved

below did not meet the standard for granting a new trial.

The

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion
when the "newly discovered evidence", which defendant claimed,
was material which could have been retrieved before trial.
Besides, the material was merely cumulative.
The evidence presented at trial supported a finding
that defendant took the property with a purpose to permanently
deprive the owner thereof.

His testimony at trial, attempting to

refute the State's evidence, was not credible.

No reasonable

minds would have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's
guilt.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Defendant's first claim of error is that his trial
counsel, Robert L. Froerer, provided ineffective assistance in
violation of defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.

He

bases this allegation on a litany of supposed failures of
counsel; these "failures" will be addressed individually in this
point.
The courts of this state have applied the standard of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

In State v. Frame, 723 P.2d

401 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court saids

In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's
representation falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Codianna v.
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1108-09 (Utah 1983).
Defendant must prove that specific,
identified acts or omissions fall outside the
wide range of professionally competent
assistance. The claim may not be
speculative, but must be a demonstrative
reality, sufficient to overcome the strong
presumption that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and exercised "reasonable
professional judgment." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, . . . (1984); . . .
And, an unfavorable result does not compel a
conclusion of ineffective assistance of
counsel. State v. Buel, 700 P.2d at 703.
Furthermore, any deficiency must be
prejudicial to defendant. It is not enough
to claim that the alleged errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome or could
have had a prejudicial effect on the fact
finders. To be found sufficiently
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively
show that a "reasonable probability" exists
that, but for counsel's error, the result
would have been different. We have defined
"reasonable probability" as that sufficient
to undermine confidence in the reliability of
the verdict.
However, these principles are not applied
as a mechanical test, but are guides to the
ultimate focus upon the fundamental fairness
of the proceeding challenged. The purpose of
the inquiry is simply to insure that
defendant receives a fair trial.
723 P.2d at 405 (footnote and additional citations omitted).
This position was reiterated, and its interplay with
pre-Strickland cases established, in State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d
909 (Utah 1988), in which the Utah Supreme Court said:
In State v. McNicol, [554 P.2d 203 (Utah
1976)] this Court held that an accused "is
entitled to the assistance of a competent
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness to
identify himself with the interests of the
accused and present such defenses as are
available under the law and consistent with
the ethics of the profession." [554 P.2d at
204].

It is not enough to claim that the alleged
ineffectiveness had some conceivable impact
on the outcome of the trial.
758 P.2d at 913 (footnotes omitted).

In State v. McNicol, 554

P.2d 203 (Utah 1976), cited in Lovell, the Supreme Court also
said:
A defendant bears the burden of
establishing the inadequacy or
ineffectiveness of counsel, and proof of such
must be demonstrable reality and not a
speculative matter.
The record must establish that counsel
was ignorant of the facts or the law,
resulting in withdrawal of a crucial
defense, reducing the trial to a "farce
and a sham."
. . .

The instant case, the acts cited by
defendant to sustain his allegation of
incompetency, falls within the ambit of an
attorney's legitimate exercise of judgment,
as to trial tactics or strategy.
554 P.2d at 204 (footnotes omitted).

The Supreme Court has

consistently said that it will "not second-guess 'an attorney's
legitimate exercise of judgment, as to trial tactics or
strategy.'"

Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 1983)

(quoting State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d at 205).
This Court has also followed the Strickland standard.
See State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
State v. Harper, 761 P.2d 570, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Harper, this Court said:
In analyzing a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, we must review the
totality of circumstances and the complete
context in which the possible attorney error

In

occurred. State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270,
273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A presumption
exists on appeal that the trial was
fundamentally fair to the defendant. State
v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 406 (Utah 1986).
761 P.2d at 571. The presumption alluded to by this Court
mandates that M'[jJudicial scrutiny of defense counsel's
performance must be highly deferential.'"

State v. Buel, 700

P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
Another principle which addresses defendant's argument
in the present case that his counsel's failure to object was
ineffective assistance, is the principle that counsel is not
required to raise a futile objection.

This principle was

recognized in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982),
abandoned on other grounds, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986):
Effective representation does not require
counsel to object when doing so would be
futile.
649 P.2d at 59. The principle was followed in State v. Iacono,
725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986), when the Supreme Court stated:
Because defendant had no ground to contest
the constitutionality of the search and the
resulting evidence, he was not denied the
effective assistance of counsel by his
attorney's failure to make a futile objection
thereto.
725 P.2d at 1378 (citations omitted).

See also State v. Wight,

765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
It has long been established that decisions about
whether to object at trial are matters of trial strategy and
given deference by appellate courts. As the Utah Supreme Court
said in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert, denied,
Wood v. Utah, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).

Trial tactics lie within the prerogative
of counsel and may not be dictated by his
client. Decisions as to what witnesses to
call, what objections to makef and, by and
large, what defenses to interpose, are
generally left to the professional judgment
of counsel.
648 P.2d at 91 (citations omitted).

See also State v. Medina,

738 P.2d 1021, 1023-24 (Utah 1987); State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d
203, 204 (Utah 1976); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109
(Utah 1983); State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985); State
v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1063-64 (Utah 1989).
As to a claim that counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to object to a police officer's testimony,
the Utah Supreme Court demonstrated the weighing process for
determining prejudice in State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah
1988) . The Court said:
[T]here was a legal basis for an objection to
all of the comments defendant identifies.
However, taking these comments as a whole,
they do not necessarily constitute harmful
error, and it is conceivable that counsel
made a deliberate and wise tactical choice in
not focusing jury attention on them by
objecting.
Although the comments made by [the
officer] were problematic, they were brief
and isolated. Furthermore, they were not so
inflammatory as to change the outcome of the
trial. The proper and admissible testimony
in this trial . . . was extensive and was so
much more serious than the objectionable
testimony that it is hard to see how the
improper testimony could have done much harm.

Counsel's judgment in failing to object to
inadmissible testimony may or may not have
been poor. However, the testimony at trial
established without much dispute all of the
details of defendant's participation in the
crime.

766 P.2d at 1067.

The Court affirmed the conviction because

Colonna had not proven that his counsel's failure to object had
prejudiced him.
A claim of ineffective assistance for failure to object
to the prosecution's closing argument involves first a
determination "whether the prosecutor's remarks were improper."
West Valley City v. Rislow# 736 P.2d 637, 638 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).

The test, as delineated in State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d

54, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973), is:
[1] did the remarks call to the attention of
the jurors matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining their
verdict, and [2] were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case,
probably influenced by those remarks.
513 P.2d at 426.

However, "[c]ounsel for both sides have

considerable latitude in their arguments to the jury; they have a
right to discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and
the inferences and deductions arising therefrom."

Jd.

The

courts will weigh the effect of any statements made by the
prosecution with the evidence presented and, "if proof of a
defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remarks by
the prosecutor will not be presumed prejudicial."
P.2d at 638.

Rislow, 736

Defense counsel is not ineffective if he does not

object because to do so might "only have emphasized the negative
aspects of the case to the jury."

Id.

Turning now to the specific allegations raised by
defendant, it is clear that his trial counsel presented an able
defense.

Defendant first claims that trial counsel's failure to

object to the admission of the prosecution's exhibits was

incompetence.

The first exhibit, the agreement written by Ms.

Cheever and signed by defendant (Addendum A), should have been
objected to, defendant says, for lack of foundation and as
hearsay.

In making this argument, defendant points only to the

testimony of Mr. Erickson that he did not draw up the agreement.
However, the exhibit was not offered into evidence until after
Ms. Cheever testified that she wrote the agreement and defendant
signed it (Tr. at 55). Clearly, the document was admissible for
whatever weight it had with the jury and, clearly, a proper
foundation was laid for its admission.

An objection for lack of

foundation and hearsay based on Mr. Erickson's testimony alone
would have been absurd.

The foundation for admitting the

document was laid by the testimony of Mr. Erickson and Ms.
Cheever before the document was offered and the objection now
urged would have been futile.
An objection to the introduction of the State's second
exhibit, the invoices (Addendum B), would also have been
rejected.

Defendant now urges that the invoices gave the wrong

market value for the pallets and that the exhibit should have
been objected to as misleading, irrelevant, immaterial, and
prejudicial.

The exhibit was identified by Mr. Erickson as

copies of invoices showing the amount charged to and by Knox
McDaniel for pallets (Tr. at 27). Defendant's suggested
objection is that this was the wrong value to place on the
pallets based on his witnesses' testimony.

That is not an

objection to the admissibility of the exhibit, but to the weight
to be given to the exhibit.

As will be addressed hereafter in

the point on the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury was
entitled to receive the evidence included on Exhibit No. 2 and to
give that evidence the weight they felt it deserved.
Next, defendant claimed that trial counsel was
incompetent for not objecting to Detective Stubbs's testimony
that defendant left a "bad trail" of information and that the
detective told defendant that he was charged with a third degree
felony.

This argument is also without merit.

Given the

testimony that defendant had given both a telephone number and a
license plate number that were one digit off, the detective could
have correctly assumed that defendant had purposely changed the
numbers to elude detection.

Neither did the detective's

statement that defendant was charged with a third degree felony
prejudice defendant.

The charge against defendant, including the

degree, was read to the jury at the beginning of trial and they
were told that the charge was not evidence that defendant had
committed the crime (Tr. at 3-4). The officer's restatement of
the degree of the crime charged was not evidence about the value
of the pallets.

There was nothing objectionable about the

testimony, and, if there were, the testimony would have been
harmless at best.

As in the Colonna case cited above, the

officer's statements were brief and not inflammatory, and, given
the evidence against defendant, it is hard to see how the
testimony could have done any harm.
Defendant next complains that his trial counsel failed
to object to the prosecutor's questions about defendant's marital
status.

First, the transcript shows that trial counsel did

object and the court overruled the objection (Tr. at 71).
Second, the questions asked by the prosecution were legitimate
questions going to the credibility of defendant.

Evidently,

defendant had stated when he was released from jail that he was
single (Tr. at 71-72).

At trial, he testified that he was

married and then, on cross-examination, testified that that
marriage was common law (Tr. at 68 and 71). Defendant's view
about his common law marriage was presented to the jury.
Defendant's further allegation that trial counsel should have
objected to the "admittance of the O.R. report" is equally
meritless.

The report was never offered or admitted into

evidence; hence, counsel could not have objected to its
admittance.
Defendant also claims that it was ineffective
assistance of counsel to fail to object to the State's
questioning of the witness from APCO.
unclear.

The basis of that claim is

The prosecution was entitled to question that witness

about the basis of his valuation of pallets.
The next claim, that the judge failed to allow
defendant's witness to give his opinion of the value of the
pallets, is without basis in fact.

Mr. Puckett testified at

length as to the amount paid for pallets (Tr. at 85-93).

The

question objected to was whether the witness was familiar with
the market value of pallets (Tr. at 91). The jury could make its
own determination about the witnesses' familiarity and the weight
to give his testimony as to the value of the pallets.

Further

testimony about value on second redirect, when this question
came, would have been merely cumulative.

As to defendant's claim that trial counsel should have
objected to the prosecutor's closing argument about the value of
the pallets, the marital status of defendant, and telling a story
about a mailman, there clearly was nothing objectionable about
the argument.

As quoted above, counsel has considerable latitude

in arguments to the jury.

Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973).

In State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975), the Supreme Court
said:
It is our opinion that it is not only the
prerogative, but the duty of either counsel,
to analyze all aspects of the evidence; and
this should include any pertinent statements
or deductions reasonably to be drawn
therefrom as to what the evidence is or is
not and what it does or does not show.
Kazda, 540 P.2d at 951.

The comments by the prosecution in

closing argument in the present case fall within this statement
from Kazda.

Since the prosecution's closing argument was not

objectionable, defendant could not have been prejudiced by trial
counsel's not objecting to it.
Defendant next claims that trial counsel failed to
conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation of this case.

His

first allegation is that trial counsel did not know what digits
in the numbers on Exhibit No. 1 were incorrect; obviously, then,
he must have failed to investigate before trial.
is not supported by the record.

That allegation

The transcript demonstrates that

trial counsel knew which letter was incorrect in the license
plate number and could not "remember offhand which number in the
phone number is off" (Tr. at 39). That passage does not support
a claim that trial counsel failed to conduct pretrial
investigation.

Defendant's additional claim that counsel did not
investigate the value of the pallets is also not supported by the
record.

Trial counsel established defendant's theory of the

value through the testimony of defendant and another nonparty
witness.

Failing to call additional witnesses as to value does

not prove that counsel neglected to conduct pretrial
investigation.

Such evidence would have been merely cumulative,

and its omission was not prejudicial to defendant.

State v.

Lacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah 1986).
The next claim also is meritless.

Defendant complains

that trial counsel neglected to obtain rulings from the court on
his objections.

The first, an objection to the detective's

statement about a pallet company going out of business, was
basically sustained.

Although the court did not use the word

"sustain", it did agree with defense counsel's objection and
direct the prosecutor to proceed with another question (Tr. at
43).

The second objection was not to the testimony of the

"expert witness" as defendant claims, but to trial counsel's
"characterization of market value" (Tr. at 92). The
prosecution's objection was based on the fact that the court had
not yet instructed the jury on the definition of "market value."
The witness had already testified as to the amount his company
paid for and charged for pallets; it was for the jury to
determine, based on the instructions, what the market value of
the pallets was.

The court sustained the objection, again

without using the word "sustain" but with the same effect.

Since

defendant's witnesses were able to testify as to the amount paid
for pallets, defendant was not prejudiced by the court's rulings.

Defendant's argument that trial counsel was incompetent
for failing to object to the jury instruction given on value is
without merit as well (Tr. at 99). This would be error only if
the instruction was erroneous.

The instruction was not

erroneous; an issue which will be addressed hereafter in a
separate point.
Defendant's final claim is that his trial counsel
committed cumulative error which prejudiced defendant through
ineffective assistance.

Since defendant has not demonstrated

that his individual claims of error have any validity, the theory
of cumulative error does not apply.

State v. Johnson, 115 Utah

Adv. Rep. 6, 12 (Utah Aug. 17, 1989); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d
498, 501-502 (Utah 1986).
The minor details which defendant now complains of do
not demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance fell
"outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.

Nor has defendant shown that he was

prejudiced by the actions of his counsel.

Taken in the light

most favorable to the jury verdict, the evidence against
defendant was overwhelming.
153, 154 (Utah 1989).

See State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d

He took the pallets, as was testified to

by himself and by Mr. Erickson.

He signed an agreement to return

the pallets within one week, as was testified to by himself and
Ms. Cheever.

He did not return the pallets, as was testified to

by himself, Mr. Erickson and Detective Stubbs.

He gave a license

plate number and a telephone number that were off by one digit to
Ms. Cheever.

He admitted to the detectives that he had taken the

pallets and told them that he had sold them.

His testimony that

attempted to refute this evidence was self-serving and clearly
not accepted by the jury.

That testimony does not negate the

weight of the evidence against defendant.
The fact that there was contradictory
testimony, without more, is not grounds for
reversal, State v. Watts, Utah 675 P.2d 566,
568 (1983). The conflicting evidence was
before the jury, and it was the jury's
responsibility to evaluate its significance.
State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289,
292 (1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 . . .
(1983).
Buel, 700 P.2d at 703 (additional citations omitted).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS MATTER PROPERLY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO DETERMINING THE
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN.
Defendant's next two points involve the determination
of the value of the pallets in order to determine the degree of
theft.

In the second point in his brief, defendant argues that

the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction for
determining the value of the property.

Defendant maintains that

the trial court's instruction should not have involved market
value but, instead, should have been based on replacement value.
He bases this argument on the theory that because the pallets
were not returned, they should have been considered destroyed.
Then he argues that because the market value could not be
ascertained, replacement value was the proper determination for
the jury to have used.

This is a misconstruction of the statute

and case law regarding value.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101 (1978) defines "value" for
purposes of the chapter in the criminal code regarding offenses
against property, including theft offenses.

Subsection (4)

reads, in pertinent part:
"Value" means:
(a) The market value of the property, if
totally destroyed, at the time and place
of the offense, or where cost of
replacement exceeds the market value; or
(b) Where the market value cannot be
ascertained, the cost of repairing or
replacing the property within a reasonable
time following the offense.
The Utah Supreme Court first addressed this statute in State v.
Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977).

The court found that the

provisions of § 76-6-101(4)(a) applied only to property that was
totally destroyed.

Because of the wording of the statute, "there

is no existing statute as to the value of stolen property which
is not ultimately destroyed.

That being the case, we must look

to the common law and to existing case law to determine the
proper test of value applicable herein."

563 P.2d at 813.

court then stated that
the common-law gradation of the offense of
larceny that is based on the value of the
property stolen has been retained in most
jurisdictions, and in the absence of statutes
providing otherwise, the measure of the value
is its fair market value at the time and
place where the alleged crime was committed.
Market value has been further clarified as
being a measure of what the owner could
expect to receive, and the amount a willing
buyer would pay to the true owner for the
stolen item. . . . [T]he test is the market
value of the property; that is, the price a
well-informed buyer would pay to a wellinformed seller where neither is obliged to
enter into the transaction.
We accept the market-value test as the
appropriate test to be used in determining

The

the value of stolen property not otherwise
provided for in our statute, and the trial
court correctly stated the law in its jury
instruction.
563 P.2d at 813 (footnotes omitted).

The highest court of this

state has determined that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101(4)(a) is only
applicable to property which is totally destroyed.

It did not

then determine, as defendant would have this Court do, that the
inapplicability of subsection (a) requires the application of
subsection (b) to theft cases not involving the destruction of
the property.

The court looked to the common law and concluded

that the market value test is the appropriate test for
determining the value in theft cases not covered by the valuation
statute.

The trial court in the present case properly used the

market value test in deciding which instruction to give to the
jury.

See also State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518-19 (Utah

1980); State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 761, 761-62 (Utah 1979); State
v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985).

In State v. Slowe, 728

P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court said:
Fair market value is not the equivalent of
"replacement cost or the price at which
someone would sell under urgent necessity,"
State v. Gorlick, Utah 605 P.2d 761, 762
(1979).
729 P.2d 112.

Defendant's contention that the trial court should

have instructed the jury regarding replacement value instead of
market value in the present case has been rejected by the courts
of this state.
Defendant's complaint about the jury instruction given
in this case is not well-founded.

The Utah Supreme Court in

State v. Logan, 563 P.2d at 812, and State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d at
518, approved the following instruction:

When the value of property alleged to have
been taken by theft must be determined, the
market value at the time and in the locality
of the theft shall be the test. That value
is the highest price, estimated in terms of
money, for which the property would have sold
in the open market at the time and in that
locality, if the owner was desirous of
selling, but under no urgent necessity of
doing so, and if the buyer was desirous of
buying but under no urgent necessity of so
doing, and if the seller had a reasonable
time within which to find a purchaser, and
the buyer had knowledge of the character of
the property and of the use to which it might
be put.
In the present case, the court gave the following instruction:
When the value of property alleged to have
been taken by the theft must be determined,
the reasonable and fair market value at the
time and in the locality of the theft shall
be the test. Fair market value is the
highest price, in cash, for which the
property would have sold in the open market
at that time and in that locality,
(1) If the owner was desirous of selling,
but under not urgent necessity of doing so;
(2) If the buyer was desirous of buying but
under no urgent necessity of doing so; (3) If
the seller had a reasonable time within which
to find a purchaser; and (4) If the buyer had
knowledge of the character of the property
and of the uses to which it might be put.
(Tr. at 104-105) (emphasis added).

The instruction given in the

present case differed from the judicially accepted instruction
only in the words underlined.

Those differences are minor and do

not invalidate the instruction.
POINT III
THE JURY CORRECTLY APPLIED THE INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE EVIDENCE AND ARRIVED AT A CORRECT
DECISION AS TO THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
TAKEN.
Defendant next maintains that the jury applied the
wrong market value to the pallets in finding defendant guilty of

felony theft.

This is also a sufficiency of the evidence

argument.
Fair market value in theft cases such as the instant
one is "the price a well-informed buyer would pay to a wellinformed seller where neither is obliged to enter into the
transaction."

Logan, 563 P.2d at 813. The value is measured "at

the time and place where the alleged crime was committed."
An owner may testify as to the value of the property taken.

Id.
In

State v. Limb# 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court
said:
In State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 439, 519
P.2d 247 (1974), this Court concluded that an
owner is competent to testify and that the
trier of fact can take its own view to the
value of the property in question. This
Court stated:
Value is something at which the jury
may take a look. The owner of an article
is competent to testify as to its value,
and such testimony is admissible, but
neither inviolate nor impervious to
disbelief. The jury may take a view of
the item for excellence or shodiness
[sic], and look through the same
spectacles at the witness to determine the
latter's imagination or credibility,—and
the verdict is its as to value. 519 P.2d
at 248.
Limb, 581 P.2d at 145.

This is a restatement of the jury's

obligation to determine the credibility of witnesses and to
determine the facts of the case. A jury's determination should
be accorded deference and "the 'Court should only interfere when
. . . reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410,

412 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,
231 (Utah 1980)).

The case of State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985),
dealt with a determination of what evidence a jury could use to
decide the issue of value.

It is clear that:

a jury [cannot] disregard expert testimony as
to the fair market value of stolen property
and fix a higher value when there is no basis
in the evidence properly before the court to
justify that value. Of course, a jury is
free to disregard expert testimony in whole
or in part, . . . and it may also discount
the value of property estimated by an expert.
707 P.2d at 662-63 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In that

case, camera equipment, which had been purchased in Price, Utah,
was stolen from a vehicle in downtown Salt Lake City.

The

prosecution introduced evidence that the value of the camera in
Price was $490.00; the defense introduced evidence that the value
was only $177.00 in Salt Lake City.

The Supreme Court reiterated

that the value was to be determined at the time and place where
the crime was committed.

Since Price is a rural community much

smaller that Salt Lake and over one hundred miles away, the
testimony of value in Price was irrelevant to the value at the
place of the crime.

Throwing out the Price valuation left only

the valuation given by Carter's witness; that value was less than
$250.00, so the conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor.

707

P.2d at 662-63.
The same reasoning was used in State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d
110 (Utah 1985), resulting in a different decision.

Slowe's

witness had testified that the purportedly stolen ring was valued
at less than $1000.00, while the prosecution's witness had
testified that the value was over that amount.

Slowe argued that

the state's witness had testified to replacement or estate value,

which left his witness's testimony as the only relevant evidence
of value.

The court stated:
On his [defendant's] expert's testimony alone
there would be no rational basis for the
jury's choosing the higher rather than the
lower figure. However, the defendant does
not accurately characterize the State's
expert witness' testimony. The State's
expert witness' appraisal was in actuality an
appraisal of the fair market value of the
ring.

728 P.2d at 112.

Since the prosecution's evidence of value was

relevant, even though it differed from the defendant's evidence,
the jury was justified in accepting the evidence from the
prosecution and convicting Slowe based on it.

^d.

See also

State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985) ("contradictory
testimony, without more, is not grounds for reversal. . . . The
conflicting evidence was before the jury, and it was the jury's
responsibility to evaluate its significance").
In the present case there was conflicting evidence
regarding the value of the pallets taken.

Mr. Erickson testified

that the cost charged to and by Knox McDaniel for the pallets was
$8.00 each (Tr. at 29 and Exhibit No. 2, Addendum B).

This was

the cost at the place from which the pallets were taken in Ogden.
On the other hand, defendant testified that the pallets he got
from Knox McDaniel were only worth $2.50 each (Tr. at 66). He
testified that the most select pallets would only bring $4.50 at
most (Tr. at 66). Defendant also called Mr. Puckett from APCO
Pallet Company, who testified that the best pallets sold for
M

[a]bout $5.50" in Salt Lake City.

Pallets of lesser value would

sell for less (Tr. at 85-86 and Exhibit No. 3, Addendum C).

Mr.

Puckett testified that the cost would vary depending on who was
buying and how many they bought (Tr. at 88).
As in most cases, the jury had before it conflicting
evidence regarding the value of the property taken.

Their

responsibility was to evaluate the contradictory testimony and
arrive at a determination of value.
702 (Utah 1985).

State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701,

They had the prosecution's evidence that Knox

McDaniel paid $8.00 apiece for the pallets delivered in Ogden as
part of its business.

They also had the prosecution's evidence

that customers of Knox McDaniel paid $8.00 each for the pallets
when the product left the company on the pallets.

Those

customers received a credit for the same amount when they
returned the pallets in good condition.

If the pallets were not

returned, the customers paid the $8.00.
On the other hand, the jury heard from defendant that
he bought and sold pallets for $2.00 to $4.50 from Provo to
Ogden.

They also heard that in Salt Lake City the APCO Company

sells pallets alone for $3.95 to $5.50, and bought pallets for
50£ to $3.00.

The difference in the place and particulars of

purchase between the two sets of evidence justified the jury's
decision to value the pallets at what Knox McDaniel paid for them
at Ogden.

The relevant testimony was the evidence from Mr.

Erickson.

The contradictory testimony from defendant and Mr.

Puckett was properly weighed by the jury, and the jury
accomplished its function of determining which testimony to
credit.

POINT IV
THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN
CLOSING ARGUMENT.
Defendant next claims that the prosecutor committed
misconduct in closing argument which prejudiced defendant.
Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor erroneously
argued the $8.00 market value of the pallets; that the
prosecutor's story about a mailman was prejudicial and
misleading; and that the prosecutor argued prejudicially about
defendant's marital status.
The Utah Supreme Court has delineated a test for
determining whether remarks by counsel constitute misconduct
which requires reversal.

As stated above, in State v. Valdez, 30

Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973), the court said:
The test of whether the remarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict, and
[2] were they, under the circumstances of the
particular case, probably influenced by those
remarks.
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426.

The court, in State v. Troy, 688 P.2d

483 (Utah 1984), further explained the second step of the Valdez
approach.

The Court directed that this step "involves a

consideration of the case as a whole."

Troy, 688 P.2d at 486.

Specifically, the Court said that
if proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the
challenged conduct or remark will not be
presumed prejudicial. State v. Seeger, 4
Or.App. 336, 479 P.2d 240 (1971). Likewise,
in a case with less compelling proof, this

Court will more closely scrutinize the
conduct.
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486.
The appellate courts of this state have long recognized
that "[c]ounsel for both sides have considerable latitude in
their arguments to the jury; they have a right to discuss fully
from their standpoints the evidence and the inferences and
deductions arising therefrom."

State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426.

See also State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988);
State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975).

However, the courts

have also defined certain limits to this latitude.

The Utah

Supreme Court indicated those limits in State v. Valdez, as
quoted above.

In State v. Kazda, the Supreme Court said:

It is our opinion that it is not only the
prerogative, but the duty of either counsel,
to analyze all aspects of the evidence; and
this should include any pertinent statements
or deductions reasonably to be drawn
therefrom as to what the evidence is or is
not and what it does or does not show.
540 P.2d at 951.

The comments by the prosecution in closing

argument in the present case fall within this statement from
Kazda.
The prosecutor in the present case followed the case
law as set out above.

He properly argued the evidence of value

which had been presented by Mr. Erickson, defendant, and Mr.
Puckett (Tr. at 113-14).

His story about the mailman was given

in the context of determining whether to believe defendant.

As

such, it did not improperly call to the attention of the jury
matters which they were not entitled to consider.

The story was

well within the latitude afforded by the courts of this state in
closing argument.

The prosecution's argument regarding defendant's
marital status was given in the context of the credibility of
defendant.

The prosecutor correctly pointed out the different

stories defendant had told at different times regarding taking
the pallets (Tr. at 117-28).

The prosecution then directed the

jury's attention to defendant's differing statements at different
times about his marital status (Tr. at 118-19).

This was proper

argument on the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences
from that evidence.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not
granting his motion for new trial.

He claims on appeal that the

errors supporting a new trial were 1) the use of $8.00 as the
market value; 2) the judge's failure to rule on objections; 3) an
erroneous jury instruction regarding value; and 4) newly
discovered evidence of the market value of the pallets.

The only

one of these supposed errors that defendant brought to the
attention of the trial court in his motion for new trial was the
claim of newly discovered evidence (R. at 73-74).

The other

claims should be deemed waived for failure to preserve them
below.

State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah).

See also

State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986).
Even if this Court were to address the claims not
preserved, the claims do not support an order for new trial. All
of the issues except the one of newly discovered evidence have
been addressed above in this brief and shown not to be error.

Since they were not error, it was not error to deny a new trial
based on those claims.
The one issue preserved below was a claim of newly
discovered evidence.

For the newly discovered evidence,

defendant submitted additional quotes regarding the value of
pallets (R. at 70). The Utah Supreme Court has said:
[T]he decision to grant or deny a new trial
is a matter of discretion with the trial
court and will not be reversed absent a clear
abuse of that discretion. . . . "New
evidence" is not evidence which was available
to defendant but not obtained by him prior to
the time of trial. . . . Nor is it evidence
that he knew about or could have discovered
prior to trial.
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) (citations
omitted).

The price quotations presented by defendant as "newly

discovered evidence" are clearly material which he either did
know or could have known before trial and are not newly
discovered evidence.

In addition, the quotations are merely

cumulative to the evidence which defendant did present at trial.
See State v. Hughes, 13 Ariz.App. 391, 477 P.2d 265, 266 (1970).
Defendant was not entitled to a new trial, and the trial court's
denial of the motion for new trial was not an abuse of
discretion.
POINT VI
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDING OF
GUILT IN THIS MATTER.
Defendant claims that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient to support his conviction.

Specifically, he

maintains that the evidence did not demonstrate that he had a
purpose to deprive Knox McDaniel of the pallets.

The appellate courts of this state have repeatedly
articulated the standard of review on appeal when the argument
concerns sufficiency of the evidence.

The appellate courts

accord great deference to the jury verdict.

It is the exclusive

function of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the
credibility of the witnesses.

"[T]he 'Court should only

interfere when . . . reasonable men could not possibly have
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

State v.

Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting State
v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)).

Furthermore, defendant

has the burden of establishing "that the evidence was so
inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime."

State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980).

also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989).

See

The courts

have succinctly stated that, unless there is a clear showing of a
lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld.

See Gabaldon,

735 P.2d at 412.
On the issue of proving a culpable mental state, the
Utah Supreme Court has said:
[A culpable mental state] need not be
proved by direct evidence, and, of course, is
always subject to denial by an accused. The
fact-finder, however, is entitled to draw all
reasonable inferences from the facts and from
the actions of the defendant. As this Court
stated in State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377,
453 P.2d 696 (1969);
With respect to the intent: It is true
that the State was unable to prove
directly what was in the defendant's mind
relative to doing harm to the victim; and
that he in fact denied any such intent.

However, his version does not establish
the fact nor does it even necessarily
raise sufficient doubt to vitiate the
conviction. If it were so, it would lie
within the power of a defendant to defeat
practically any conviction which depended
upon his state of mind. [453 P.2d at
697.]
State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1979).

The requisite

mental state may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or
from the surrounding circumstances.

State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d

1220, 1223 (Utah 1983) .
In his brief, defendant claims that he showed his
license to the secretary, which demonstrates that he must not
have had a purpose to deprive.

He does not cite to the record

for this "fact", and the record does not support such a
statement.
Defendant testified that he just forgot to return the
pallets.

This statement does not refute the overwhelming

evidence against defendant, evidence which fully supports the
jury's verdict.

Taken in the light most favorable to the

verdict, the evidence shows that defendant picked up the pallets
at Knox McDaniel and then gave the secretary a license plate
number and a telephone number, both of which contained one digit
which was different from the correct ones.
pallets in the time specified.

He did not return the

When the police were able to

trace defendant, he told them that he had just forgotten to
return the pallets.

Then he told them that he had taken the

pallets directly to APCO and sold them.

At trial, he returned to

his story of having just forgotten to return the pallets.
claimed that he had not been told when to return them.
•3 C

He

He said

that he had lied to the officers about selling the pallets in
order to get them to tell him what the case was about.
The jury's decision to discredit the testimony of
defendant, who, at the very least, admitted to lying to the
officers, cannot be faulted.

The evidence is ample to show that

reasonable minds would not have entertained a reasonable doubt of
defendant's guilt.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _^_j^_ day of March, 1990.
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